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ENVIRONMENTAL INSTRUMENT CHOICE IN
A SECOND-BEST WORLD: A COMMENT ON
PROFESSOR RICHARDS
DANIEL H. COLE*
Economists and legal scholars have long touted the efficiency
advantages of “market-based” approaches to environmental protection—particularly effluent taxes and tradeable permits—over traditional command-and-control regulatory approaches such as technol1
ogy-based standards. Recent successful experiments with tradable
permitting, most notably in the acid rain program of the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments,2 have buoyed their claims that market-based
approaches can achieve society’s environmental protection goals at
far lower cost than command-and-control regulations. According to
some estimates, the acid rain program’s sulfur dioxide trading program has saved $97 million or 13 percent of compliance costs (in
1995), compared to a non-tradable quota system.3 This success, along
with various other studies suggesting that “market-based” approaches
have general efficiency advantages over command-and-control regulation,4 have led policy analysts and legal scholars to advocate marketbased approaches for all manner of environmental protection and re-

* M. Dale Palmer Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis.
1. See, e.g., J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES (1968); T.H. TIETENBERG,
EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY (1985); Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333
(1985); J.B. OPSCHOOR & HANS B. VOS, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION (1989).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1997).
3. See DALLAS BURTRAW & ERIN MANSUR, THE EFFECTS OF TRADING AND BANKING
IN THE SO2 ALLOWANCE MARKET 2 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 99-25,
1999).
4. For a list and general assessment of various “empirical” studies supposedly demonstrating efficiency advantages of tradeable permits over command-and-control regulation, see
T.H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, in ECONOMIC POLICY
TOWARDS THE ENVIRONMENT 86 (Dieter Helm ed., 1991). For a critique of Tietenberg’s conclusions, see Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Efficient?
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for
Environmental Protection, 1999 WISC. L. REV. 887, 889-92.
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source conservation activities.5 Some go so far as to argue that the
entire regulatory system should be overhauled; presumptively “inefficient” command-and-control programs should be completely replaced
with the “next generation” of “market-based” environmental policies.6
In response, other scholars have cautioned against the wholesale
7
reformulation of environmental policy. Steinzor has warned that
“without dramatically expanding the resources available to federal
and state regulators, and without placing challenging, new demands
on pollution sources to track emissions and research their toxicological effects, the shift to the ‘next generation’ of regulatory policy is
likely to result in severe degradation of environmental quality.”8 Cole
and Grossman have shown that command-and-control regulation can
be efficient, and in some circumstances, more efficient than tradable
permits or other market-based approaches.9 And Driesen has argued
that the presumed dichotomy between command-and-control and
“market-based” approaches is overblown and prejudicial to policy
making; he recommends replacing the dichotomy with “a more nuanced analytical approach to both traditional regulation and economic incentive programs.”10
Now, Professor Richards, in Framing Environmental Policy In11
strument Choice, provides a framework for understanding the wide
variety of circumstances in which alternative instruments for envi5. See, e.g., William W. Sapp, The Supply-Side and Demand-Side of Wetlands Mitigation
Banking, 74 OR. L. REV. 951 (1993); David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, From Smokestacks to
Species: Extending the Tradeable Permit Approach from Air Pollution to Habitat Conservation,
15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 405 (1996); Carrie A. Tipton, Note, Protecting Tomorrow’s Harvest: Developing a National System of Individual Transferable Quotas to Conserve Ocean Resources, 14
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381 (1995).
6. See, e.g., ENTERPRISE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
SYSTEM IN TRANSITION: TOWARD A MORE DESIRABLE FUTURE (1998); THINKING
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (M.R. Chertow &
D.C. Esty eds., 1997).
7. See, e.g., William F. Pedersen, Jr., The Limits of Market-Based Approaches to Environmental Protection, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,173 (1994); David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading
an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289 (1998); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: Back to the Past by Way of the Future, 28 ELR NEWS & ANALYSIS 10361 (1998);
Cole & Grossman, supra note 4.
8. Steinzor, supra note 7, at 10362.
9. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 4, at 937. Richards evidently concurs. See Kenneth
R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
221, 226 (2000).
10. See Driesen, supra note 7, at 295.
11. Richards, supra note 9.
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ronmental protection might be preferred. His work emphasizes two
important points: the range of policy choices is far broader than analysts often assume; and policy choices depend on a number of variables beyond cost-of-compliance, which has been the almost exclusive
focus of economic literature on environmental instrument choice.
Consequently, a “one-size-fits-all approach to instrument choice”
cannot possibly succeed.12 In the real, second-best world, first-best
solutions may not be possible, let alone preferable.
Richards’ general thesis seems beyond legitimate dispute. His
taxonomy appears to provide a clear improvement over the more
simplistic comparative environmental-policy analyses that he abjures.
In his view, the economic literature on environmental protection has
focused on too few policy options and has over-emphasized the differences among those options. Indeed, the distinction between command-and-control regulations and economic instruments, such as
tradable permits, is “not as stark as it appears,” because “most of the
market approaches that have been used in the United States operate
13
within the standard command-and-control framework.” As Cole
and Grossman have observed, tradable permit programs are basically
14
commands-without-control.
More generally, it is a misnomer to refer to certain regulatory
approaches as “market-based” or “incentive-based,” implying that
others are not. All regulatory approaches are designed to affect market behavior by creating incentives (of one kind or another) to reduce
15
pollution levels. The only real grounds for distinguishing between
alternative approaches to environmental protection is on the basis of
their comparative environmental and economic performance, which
inevitably depend on several endogenous and exogenous variables—
more than are accounted for in standard analytical frameworks. Indeed, many (if not most) economic analyses focus on a single cost
variable:16 comparative compliance/abatement cost (which Richards
12. See id. at 223.
13. See J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 15 (1998).
14. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 4, at 895.
15. See Driesen, supra note 7, at 290. Similarly, as I have argued elsewhere, it is a misnomer
to refer to only some environmental protection approaches as “property-based,” because all
approaches to resolving the “tragedy of the commons” inevitably are property-based, including
command-and-control regulation or outright government ownership of environmental goods.
See Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and Environmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 103, 105-109 (1999). Richards seems to concur expressly with this view in Footnote 47. See Richards, supra note 9, at 231, n.47.
16. See, e.g., WALTER O. SPOFFORD, JR., EFFICIENCY PROPERTIES OF ALTERNATIVE
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describes as “production costs”).17 As Russell et al. have noted, economic analyses of environmental regulation tend to assume “perfect
18
(and, incidentally, costless) monitoring;” or they mistakenly assume
that monitoring costs do not vary among policy alternatives.19 In addition, Richards notes, they ignore the public finance implications of
20
alternative policy choices. Richards’ taxonomy accounts for more
important variables, including monitoring costs, public finance implications, legal constraints, and, importantly, the extent and distribution
of residual pollution harm. The result should be a better-informed
approach to questions of instrument choice.
A distinctive contribution of Richards’ article is his explicit application of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) to questions of
environmental instrument choice. Although most legal scholars are
familiar with the work of one of the founders of NIE, Ronald Coase,
most are unaware of this distinctive approach to Law & Economics,
and how it differs from conventional, Chicago-school Law and Economics.
The NIE is a distinct school of thought within the family of Law
& Economics. As its name suggests, NIE builds on “old” institutionalist arguments about the embeddedness of economic activity in so21
cial (including legal) institutions, but without jettisoning the explanatory powers of standard, neoclassical economic theory.
Following Ronald Coase’s insight about the critical role transaction
costs play in determining economic structures and performance, NIE
scholars realize that the comparative efficiency of alternative organizational structures (of markets, firms, and governments) and policy
instruments varies with the precise institutional (and technological)
circumstances. As Coase himself has noted, all of society’s primary
mechanisms for organizing economic behavior—markets, firms, and
SOURCE CONTROL POLICIES FOR MEETING AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS: AN
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO THE LOWER DELAWARE VALLEY, (Resources for the Future
Discussion Paper No. R-2524-EPA, 1980); Scott E. Atkinson & Donald H. Lewis, A CostEffectiveness Study of Alternative Air Quality Control Strategies, 1 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
237, 239-240 (1974); Alan J. Krupnick, Costs of Alternative Policies for the Control of Nitrogen
Dixoide in Baltimore, 13 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 189 (1986).
17. See Richards, supra note 9, at 228-29.
18. See CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL ET AL., ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 3 (1986).
19. For an explanation of why this assumption is mistaken, see Cole & Grossman, supra
note 4, at 904-05.
20. See Richards, supra note 9, at 229.
21. For an introduction to the “Old” and “New” Institutionalisms, see NICHOLAS
MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POSTMODERNISM 101-156 (1997).
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governments—are “more or less failures.”22 Consequently, there is no
universal, first-best institutional solution to every perceived social and
legal problem regardless of context. We inhabit a second-best world,
in which our goal must be to structure social and economic interactions by those institutions and organizations that, in the circumstances, are least likely to fail, or are likely to fail the least. This requires the kind of Comparative Institutional Analysis advocated by
the “old” institutionalists,23 but with an important new metric: transaction costs. The costs of transacting (positively) explain why different institutional and organizational arrangements result in differential
economic performance and (normatively) prescribe certain institutional and organizational forms as more efficient than others. The
NIE’s focus on institutions, which are defined as formal laws and informal social norms that together comprise the “rules of the game,”24
and organizations, which are the mechanisms by which the “rules of
the game” are created, applied, and enforced,25 require NIE scholars
to take a broad, inclusive approach to analysis.
German New Institutionalists Eirik Furubotn and Rudolf Rich26
ter have identified five distinct but related strands of NIE research:
Transaction-cost economics
Property-rights analysis
Economic theory of contracts
Agency theory
Relational and incomplete contract theory
The new institutional approach to economic history
The new institutional approach to political economics
Cole and Grossman have previously applied several of these
analytical strands of the NIE school to environmental instrument
choice.27 But Richards’ is the first work to explicitly apply Williamsonian contract theory to the problem of environmental instrument
28
choice, with important benefits for theory. Richards notes that in

22. See Ronald H. Coase, The Regulated Industries: Discussion 54 AMER. ECON. REV. 194,
195 (1964).
23. See MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 21, at 121-23.
24. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3-6 (1990).
25. See id.
26. See EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 31-32 (1998).
27. See, e.g., Cole & Grossman, supra note 4; Cole, supra note 15.
28. See Richards, supra note 9, at 259-66.
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environmental instrument choice, as with contracts, the degree of asset specificity—in the form of transaction-specific investments—together with the degree of ex ante uncertainty about the future can affect instrument choice.29
In addition to his explicit application of NIE theory to environmental instrument choice, Richards’ framework is unique in attending
to the public finance implications of environmental instrument
choice. He makes clear that the use of different environmental instruments (taxes, subsidies, quotas, etc.) would have differential impacts for public finance, impacts that are relevant to policy-making.
Richards is also quite correct to note “legal constraints” on in30
strument choice, but his discussion of legal constraints is somewhat
misleading. Regulatory takings doctrine, for example, never really
“prevent[s] the government from employing the regulatory option,”
as Richards asserts;31 it merely raises the costs to the government and
the taxpayer of the government’s decision to use certain regulatory
options in some circumstances. Thus, it has IC and TX implications
(in Richards’ formula for determining total environmental protection
32
costs). Another “legal constraint,” Richards notes, is that land-use
control has traditionally been a local-government concern, rather
than a federal-government concern.33 This is true, but it has less to do
with legal than political constraints. There are, of course, important
(and controversial) examples of direct federal land-use regulation,
most notably the wetlands permitting program under the Clean Wa34
35
ter Act and the Endangered Species Act. And, no doubt, under the
Supreme Court’s expansive reading of the Constitution’s commerce
clause,36 the federal government has plenty of power to further regulate land use, if it so desires.
More appropriately, Richards notes as a “legal constraint” on
environmental policy choice the rule against “legislative entrench-

29. See id. at 261.
30. See id. at 273-78.
31. See id. at 273.
32. For further explanation of IC (implementation costs) and TX (public finance impacts),
see id. at 229.
33. See id. at 275-76.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1997).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1997) (prohibiting landowners from doing anything on their
land that would constitute a “tak[ing]” of an endangered species).
36. Const. (US), Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.; see generally Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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ment.”37 This rule arguably obstructs the government from providing
the “credible commitments” necessary to give regulated industries
confidence that the government would not change the rules mid-game
(so to speak). However, this may not be as significant a problem as
Richards suggests. He notes that “credible commitments” are most
important for environmental taxes and subsidies because those environmental instruments are less durable (that is, more changeable)
than command-and-control regulations.38 There is reason, however,
to be suspicious of this assertion. Environmental taxes and subsidies
require legislative action (authorization and appropriation), while
changes in command-and-control regulations—for instance, changes
in the determination of “best available technology”—may only require new administrative rules. It is surely no quick and easy matter
for bureaucrats to promulgate new rules, but intuition suggests that it
39
is easier to change administrative rules than legislation.
There is, however, reason to suppose that the problem of “credible commitment” would bear on some environmental instruments
more than others. With wholly coercive instruments, such as command-and-control regulations, the credibility of the government’s
commitment would seem relatively (though not completely) unimpor40
tant. Since the regulated industry has to comply anyway, whether or
not the rules are changeable should not greatly influence their behavior, except perhaps their decisions to engage in research to innovate new pollution-control technologies.41 On the other hand, a lack
of “credible commitment” could well affect a permit trading market,
where the willingness of regulated firms to trade pollution “allow37. See Richards, supra note 9, at 276-78.
38. See id.
39. Richards even notes that one of the primary advantages of hierarchical instruments
(i.e., direct regulations) is that they allow rapid adaptation to changes. See Richards, supra note
9, at 264.
40. A credible commitment to enforce the rules (however changeable) would, of course,
remain critical.
41. There is a sizeable amount of literature about the differential impacts that alternative
environmental instruments have on incentives to innovate pollution-control technologies. See,
e.g., Adam Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulations: The
Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on Technology Diffusion, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. S43 (1995); Wesley A. Magat, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation,
43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4 (1979); Alan S. Miller, Environmental Regulation, Technological
Innovation, and Technology-Forcing, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 1995, at 64; Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm Incentives To Promote Technological Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 247 (1989). It is worth noting, however, that most of these
studies focus on incentives to innovate only within the regulated industries themselves; they ignore the incentives that may be created for third-party innovation.
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ances” could easily depend on their level of confidence in the security
of the market itself—that is, whether they feel secure that the government will not intervene haphazardly and reduce quotas, thereby
rendering past trades worthless. This has been a concern, for example, with the sulfur dioxide trading market of the Clean Air Act’s acid
42
rain program.
The Environmental Protection Agency has confronted this problem directly in regulations relating to previous trading programs.43
This leads to the only significant failing of Richards’ paper: the
absence of any applications of the framework to demonstrate how it
would operate in real cases to yield better-informed evaluations of
environmental instrument choices. Including empirical applications
would, of course, have made an already sizeable paper substantially
longer; perhaps that is reason enough for leaving the task for another
day. But it would have been instructive if Richards had provided at
least one application of his analytical framework, perhaps in comparison with another, more simplistic framework upon which his improves.
Empirical applications would be helpful in resolving several
questions, which cannot be answered by a general set of “heuristic
44
principles.” Consider, for example, Richards’ “Summary of Factors
45
Affecting Instrument Choice.” In that summary, he suggests that
zero-baseline taxes may be the most attractive instrument from the
perspective of the marginal cost of public funds, but relatively unattractive from the perspective of monitoring costs (which he describes
as “Cost of Output Measurement”).46 But would not monitoring
costs, which obviously require government spending, have a bearing
on the marginal cost of public funds? And if so, might that not reduce the comparative advantage of a tax instrument with respect to
the marginal cost of public funds?
More generally, the utility of Richards’ framework should be determined not just by its more inclusive list of cost factors but also by
the practical ability of policy-makers and policy analysts to accurately
assess those cost factors in particular cases. Empirical applications
42. See, e.g., Jeanne M. Dennis, Smoke for Sale: Paradoxes and Problems of the Emissions
Trading Program of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1101, 11181122 (1992).
43. See EPA, Emissions Trading Technical Document 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,847, n. 48
(1986).
44. See Richards, supra note 9, at 279.
45. See id. at 280.
46. See id.
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would help to assess just how difficult or easy it would be to put dollar
signs on the various factors Richards’ framework incorporates. If it
turned out to be difficult, that might militate in favor of more limited
frameworks that incorporate fewer and most easily quantified cost
factors. We might intuit that analytical frameworks focused on compliance/abatement costs (which Richards refers to as “production
costs”)47 have an advantage because, compared to other costs involved in the regulatory process, compliance/abatement costs are
relatively easy to estimate, compared to implementation and public
finance costs. On the other hand, a recent study suggests that ex ante
compliance-cost estimates regularly exceed actual costs.48 This reminds us that pervasive uncertainty limits our ability to accurately estimate ex ante costs and benefits, whatever the analytical framework.
It is important, nevertheless, to learn whether (and, if so, the extent to
which) Richards’ framework is workable; and that requires empirical
applications.
Before it is tested in applications, it would be premature to conclude that Richards’ framework for environmental instrument choice
marks a clear improvement over previous models. But it is tempting
to draw that conclusion anyway, if only because the earlier models are
so plainly flawed. If nothing else, Richards reminds us that it is insufficient to focus exclusively on compliance/abatement costs, as many
49
previous studies have done, for choosing from among alternative environmental instruments. Implementation costs (e.g., costs of monitoring and enforcement) and public finance implications are equally
important factors.
It may be possible for scholars, in the future, to study environmental instrument choice without using Richards’ precise taxonomy,
but we can no longer ignore the vitally important factors his taxonomy incorporates. To analyze instrument choice solely on the basis of
compliance/abatement costs, with no consideration of monitoring
costs or the implications for public finance, is to assess only a fraction
of the total costs involved. More than anything else, Richards’ taxonomy points the way toward a much-needed total-cost model of environmental instrument choice.
47. See id. at 228-29.
48. These presumptions may well be counterfactual, however. If actual cost-of-compliance
estimates are any indication, then regulated industries seem unable to make accurate ex ante
estimates of compliance costs. See WINSTON HARRINGTON ET AL., ON THE ACCURACY OF
REGULATORY COST ESTIMATES (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 99-18, 1999)
<http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/PDF_files/9918.pdf>.
49. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

